position of the Dutch Red Cross and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the matter -debated the value of chemical warfare publicly in a variety of media.
That there was no newspaper discussion of substance on the topic of gas warfare during the war and early post-war years is significant particularly as the nature of reporting in the Netherlands was quite different from that which occurred in belligerent newspapers. 4 This article advances several possible explanations for this lack of investigation, reflecting both on the politics of neutrality as well as the relative isolation of the various groups who had a particular interest in the topic. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that gas warfare did not catch the public's imagination or that chemical warfare was not thought about and discussed outside the very public gaze of the daily news media. Above all, the lack of public wartime debate does not take away from the fact that there were distinct and markedly divergent views on poison gas use in the Netherlands during the war, which, ultimately, contributed to a vibrant and very public debate on the topic in the late 1920s. At that stage, the perceived public image that gas was an inhumane weapon of industrial war came under attack and revision.
Wartime reporting on poison gas
In contrast to interwar newspaper coverage on topics of poison and gas as weapons of war, wartime reporting in the Netherlands tended to focus on the factual -what happened, when and where. Across the spectrum of political and editorial publications, a moral judgement, let alone deep felt indignation, about gas warfare was noticeably absent, although certain pro-German and pro-Allied biases were apparent. While most Netherlanders were firmly committed to neutrality, preferring to stay out of the war at almost any cost above an alliance with either the Entente or Central Powers, there were obvious pro-British and pro-German biases in newspaper reporting, depending on a newspaper's audience and editorial preferences. 5 These leanings did impact on the interpretation of the events of the war and were, also, carefully monitored and promoted by the belligerents where they were able. Still, the relative moral or strategic merits of the use of gas on the Belgian and French fronts from 1915 on were rarely commented upon in mainstream newspaper reports, which may reflect an adherence to the international legal requirement that neutral countries do nothing to jeopardise their country's impartial position, or suggest that gas was one of a string of major and deadly war events that all deserved mention in the news but warranted no special attention in and of themselves, particularly since the risk they posed to the Netherlands was not immediately obvious.
In the leading liberal newspaper, Het Algemeen Handelsblad (The General Economist), for example, the use of gas was first mentioned on 24 April 1915 in a purely matter of fact way. 6 Another liberal newspaper, the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (New Rotterdam Paper, NRC) mentioned the use of 'poisonous fumes' at
Ypres that day in the same factual manner, 7 although it did reflect on the belligerents' perspectives on the development by stating that 'according to General
French' the use of poison gas was a violation of the The Hague Conventions (1907), while the Germans had remarked a week earlier that the Allied forces had started using chemicals, which the NRC commented was 'a clear attempt [by Germany] to nip criticism from neutral countries in the bud'. 8 The NRC clearly understood that the use of gas was contentious and was understood as contentious by all parties, but held firm to its duty as a leading newspaper of a neutral country not to pass comment on the relative merits of either belligerent cause. Importantly, it signalled as much to its readers when it commented that 'as a consequence of a lack of information, we will not pass judgment' except to state that 'using gas [the actual word used was 'rook' which translates to 'smoke'] in battle to force the enemy either to suffocate or flee' was horrible, but as old as warfare itself, and no more or less horrible than 'the use of flooding to force the enemy either to drown or flee', a likely reference to the Allies earlier inundation of the Yser or to the Dutch defence 6 Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 24-4-1915, 1. 7 Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 24-4-1915, Ochtendblad B, 3. plans for the protection of Fortress Holland by flooding the countryside around it. 9 In other words, passing judgement on Germany for its use of gas required, according to the NRC editors, equal judgement of other acts of war that were used and adopted by the Allies and the Dutch themselves. Another author, J. Bleeker, used many of the heroic ideas about war prevalent in most belligerent societies of the time in a fictional story about a mutilated soldier who had 'murdered and maimed for freedom and fatherland', who had gone into war with grand hopes for military life and warfare, but soon lost these when he faced the reality of the western front: a war 'of shells and grenades, of liquid fire and poisonous gasses, of invisible enemies on distant places, has no romance in it'.
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The Dutch cartoonist Albert Hahn (1877 Hahn ( -1918 , furthermore, published his work in the socialist, satirical De Notenkraker (The Nutcracker). Convinced pacifist and not eager to limit his anti-war opinions, he used the image of gas and gasmasks to illustrate his opinion that the war had taken a turn for the worst on 22 April 1915.
Shortly thereafter he published two cartoons on chlorine called 'The new death'
(illustration 1) and 'The blessing of weapons' (illustration 2), at the same time attacking the role of religion in modern warfare.
Illustration 1: The new death: chlorine (The Nutcracker, 30-4-1915) 12 'Oorlogspoezie onder het volk ', De Groene Amsterdammer, 30-12-1916, 9. 13 J. Bleeker, 'Het Spookhuis', De Groene Amsterdammer, 9-11-1918, 3. Illustration 2: Blessing the weapons: chlorine (The Nutcracker, 29-5-1915) His most effective depiction, however, came a few months later, when he critiqued the effects of industrial warfare by linking a soldier wearing a gas mask with a monkey in the cartoon 'The evolution of mankind' (illustration 3). The depiction summed up his view that this war was inhumane, regressive and bestial. Many of Hahn's readers shared his view: the war was turning soldiers into animals, more 'monkey' than 'man'. Illustration 6: P. van der Hem (8-5-1915) : Ypers
Gas and the Dutch military and political leadership
While the Dutch public's engagement with the concept of gas warfare was generally an intellectual one -gas was part of a war that they wished to stay out of -the most pressing concern for the Dutch authorities during the war was how to combat undertaking in aid of the country's defence '. 20 By the end of the war, the country had 380 tonnes of asphyxiating gasses in stock and had experimented with numerous ways of projecting and distributing the poison over as wide a distance as possible. 21 That their own forces barely had enough gas masks to protect themselves from the deadly vapours was secondary to the potential advantages of gas to defend a country with a declining defensive capacity. The potentials of gas warfare were, therefore, obvious to the Dutch military and government leadership. It is telling of the nature of the war as well as the desperate defensive position the country was in, that, between 1915 and 1918, there was no official discussion or debate about whether the army should use gas, let alone whether the country should produce chemical weaponry. In this way, gas was not seen as an ethical concern but rather as a pragmatic reality.
The Dutch pacifists' view of chemical warfare
Where the Neder (Down with Arms) group, despised war in all its forms and gas was only another example of the inhumanity of war. In other words, gas was a small part of a much larger anti-war campaign. While many anti-militarists agreed that gas was particularly loathsome, they also advocated that chemical weapons were a symptom of modern warfare that should, therefore, not be singled out. It was inappropriate to place any greater value on gas, or to engage with notions that gas was more inhumane than other weapons. It was not weaponry that had to be eradicated but human beings' drive for war. Hence, it was not in the methods of war that the anti-militarists sought solutions but in the abolition of war and militarism. To them, war was not and never had been a 'gentlemanly' struggle, in which honour and glory were at the behest of every man-soldier. The use of gas only strengthened the anti-militarists arguments that war and militarism were the devil's works. This point of view was particularly important to the anti-militarist vicar, Bart de Ligt, who was repeatedly banished from 'state of siege' areas during the war out of fear he would undermine mobilised soldiers' morale. In the 1920s, De Ligt took a strong stand against the use of gas but also held that it was impossible to separate its use from the wider concerns brought about by the mere existence of war, armies and defence preparations. Isolating gas as a particularly 'barbarous' means to wage war suggested that wars could be fought as long as this was done 'humanely'. He reiterated the famous exclamation from Dutch anarchist Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis: 'to humanise war is to humanise the devil.'
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The anti-military position is important as it kept one of the most vocal and active voices against war in the neutral Netherlands as good as silent on the issue of the use of gas as a weapon of war. At least from this group there was no public admonishment of the belligerents' use of gas warfare, which, significantly, also helped to protect the Netherlands' neutral position. Similarly, the anti-militarist activists did not force the Dutch armed forces to account for their production of chemical weaponry (although outside of the armed forces few Dutch may have known about it at the time).
As a result, there was no driver for public debate on the issue of chemical warfare during the war.
The Dutch medical world's experiences of gas wounds
Even without public debate, however, there were other experiences and interpretations of the impact of chemical warfare around during the war. The most significant -in terms of fuelling post-war debate -was that of the Dutch medical profession, large numbers of whom spent time on the war fronts treating wounded soldiers. Importantly, however, most medical publications during the war were silent on the impact and ethics of the use of gas as a weapon. Nevertheless, it was in the answers to gas wounds. From reading this chapter, the only conclusion one can draw is that there were few, a position that was in line with the opinions of his surgical and non-surgical medical colleagues elsewhere. Physicians 'failed to master gas weapon injuries', as the historian Marion Girard, author of A Strange and Formidable Weapon put it. In other words, the treatment of gas illnesses and wounds was the treatment of symptoms. The only way to get the chemicals out of the body once they had entered was to give them time and hope that the dose was small and the poisons not too strong. Symptoms differed with every kind of poison and new versions appeared regularly, which made it almost impossible to come up with effective treatments. All doctors could do was to advise victims to keep warm, drink plenty of water, say one's prayers, and with time and patience hope things turned out for the better. In this inability to combat gas poisoning, Fransen acknowledged his underlying helplessness as a doctor. Perhaps one of the reasons for the lack of reporting on gas weaponry within the Dutch medical world during the war was that gas wounds offered no genuine medical or scientific challenge. Furthermore, due to the nature of their profession, many doctors would not be drawn into any ethical debates about the wider significance of gas weaponry. They would describe symptoms and offer solutions where possible, but they did so without passing judgement on the use of the weapons in the first place. Their presence on the war fronts as representatives of a neutral country may have influenced, at least in part, this position. While undoubtedly many Dutch doctors and nurses developed sympathies for the cause of the side of the frontline they were working on, they, more than their counterparts from warring countries, tended to see in their patients pitiable victims of war before military and scientific opportunities. As a result, they tended not to treat their patients with the same 'objective' and 'controlled approach' that characterised German and Allied physicians' behaviour, at least according to Girard.
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Some Dutch doctors and, particularly, nurses, however, stepped outside the restraints that their profession and their neutral nationality seemed to demand of them. In some of their writings, they mentioned the horrors of war and the moralities and 'inhumanity' behind the use of gas were often subsumed in their comments. 27 To many of them, gas warfare had gone where they, as medical men and from a stint at a front-line hospital to his home in Utrecht in 1917, neurophysiologist and pharmacist professor Rudolf Magnus held a lecture about the relationship between war and medicine pointing out how war was an ideal training ground even for experienced doctors and surgeons and one that would benefit medicine in the long-term and their non-soldier patients as well. According to Magnus, the war proved an ideal way to experiment and learn about all manner of medical ailments and wounds. Magnus also focussed on the advantages brought about by gas warfare, which made the invention of better equipment a necessity and would therefore ensure safer gas masks and other safety devices in case of accidents in chemical industries. 32 The divergence in opinion among Dutch medical experts and practitioners during the war were an important driver of the post-war debate on the value of gas warfare more generally. In contrast to these pro-gas arguments, the war experiences, memoirs and stories told by men and women like Vera Brittain, Erich Maria Remarque and Wilfred
A real debate -the 1920s
Owen presented gas as a horrible weapon because of the fear it spread and the way it killed or wounded. Even Ernst Jünger did not disagree with them on this point.
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Belgian soldier-poet Daan Boens expressed similar sentiments in his poem 'Gas'
The stench is unbearable, while death mocks back.
The masks around the cheeks cut the look of bestial snouts, the masks with wild eyes, crazy or absurd, their bodies drift on until they stumble upon steel.
The men know nothing, they breathe in fear.
Their hands clench on weapons like a buoy for the drowning, they do not see the enemy, who, also masked, loom forth, and storm them, hidden in the rings of gas.
Thus in the dirty mist, the biggest murder happens. ...
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When released -either by cylinders or grenades -gas was uncontrollable, mastered only by the wind, and was indiscriminately breathed in by or dripped onto soldiers and non-combatants alike. Indeed it spread a fear unexplained just by its actual casualty rate, probably because of the way it killed: silently, through suffocation and without leaving any battle wound (although this does not apply to mustard gas, which could rip of your entire skin). 43 Gasmasks were always in competition with new chemicals. While, in time, the masks were more effective, they could not eradicate the fear of gas, most importantly because soldiers often believed them to be ineffective; which was only partly true. 44 Furthermore the masks proved cumbersome and 'dehumanising' to wear and, as such, were a cause of psychological problems among soldiers. Besides, gas was always used in combination with bullets, shells and grenades. Usually it was not unconsciousness and imprisonment that determined the fate of a gas victim but artillery or machine-gun fire. Therefore, even if gas was by itself a largely non-lethal weapon, soldiers knew that it was a weapon that often proved fatal. In other words, while military leaders might advocate that 'it was better to recover from a gas poisoning than to die of a non-poisoned bullet', many soldiers had an opposite opinion. For those who did recover, gas often left long-lasting legacies among which blindness and respiratory ailments were common. 45 It was this experience that bolstered the anti-gas campaign in Britain and abroad during the 1920s.
The International Red Cross
Professor Magnus's opinion on the medical advantages of (chemical) From this position, war was not an enemy of medicine, but rather its colleague or even teacher. 47 In how far such opinions aligned with those of International Red Cross doctors -most of whom came from military backgrounds -is uncertain. Importantly, however, the ICRC, a neutral organisation when it came to the politics of war, took a very strong stand against gas warfare in the last year of the war.
On 6 February 1918, the ICRC, which just had been rewarded the Nobel Peace
Prize, protested against the use of poison gas and other modern weaponry. According to the committee, such weapons ended any illusion that war was a 'struggle between gentlemen' and highlighted the realities of modern industrial conflict killing and maiming indiscriminately. The protest was unique in the ICRC's history since it usually hid behind the principle of impartiality and non-interference in the politics and military decisions of warring countries, focussing instead on aiding all victims of war and crisis regardless of background and circumstance. However, in the case of gas attacks, the institution felt compelled to report on the general inhumanity of the use of gas on soldiers and civilians alike especially since the use of 'poison or poisonous weapons' and 'projectiles causing unnecessary harm' were prohibited by the The Hague Conventions. 48 The ICRC felt that the continued use of such weaponry would lead to a situation in which 'warfare would be nothing else but a work of 55 Roozenbeek, Van Woerden, o.c., 76, 83, 90; Haber, o.c., 295-6; Girard, o.c., 185-97; Jozef Goldblat, CB Disarmament Negotiations 1920 -1970 effects on victims further changed in a subtle but key respect. At this conference, the organisation acknowledged that it was not enough to advocate for a ban on such weapons, it also needed to prepare for dealing with the impact of chemical warfare as well as finding ways to combat it effectively. It offered a prize for the best ideas to protect against gas attack and then implemented the innovations, which included improving gas masks, gas-locking and air-conditioning units for underground shelters, and developing reactants to mustard gas. 60 In other words, the ICRC waged war against gas warfare as best it was able, firstly by attempting to make this method of fighting illegal and then on making it impractical, because who would need to use the weapon if its uses could be neutralised?
The changing position of the Dutch Red Cross
The change in focus of the ICRC on combating the effects of gas warfare, rather than continuing its protests against the 'inhumanity' of its use, caused the Committee to receive intense criticism from pacifists and peace movements alike. For the staunchly anti-gas campaigners, the ICRC had deserted their cause and had as good protection and rights of those coming into contact with it in line with the Geneva conventions, the first of which were signed in 1864.
58 'Internationale Rode Kruis-conferentie', Persdienst, 20 (28-11-1928) Now that the military, present also in the Red Cross, is out of answers, now that at last our warnings are dripping through, now that at last it becomes clear that humanity is hopelessly lost against one of the most infernal weapons of our Christian governments, the Netherlands anything but excluded, now we have to solve a prize question…!! A fool is he who still co-operates with such (war) work. We tear off the Red Cross's mask, so the world can see that this organization is nothing but an accessory of militarism existing under the pretence of goodness. grenades, but did not extend this to the use of gas. In their eyes, gas was not an 'honest' weapon. Choking was an inhumane way of dying. Whoever used gas had done away with 'civilisation' and had regressed humanity at the same time.
The lack of discourse between these various views on gas changed dramatically during the 1920s. The reasons behind the shift lay with the strategy of the Dutch Red Cross and by the increasing amount of available publicity that gas was a much more humane weapon of war than other more traditional weapons. The
International Red Cross and its local Dutch committee played key parts. While initially, they worked with other groups and organisations within and outside the Netherlands to ban gas weaponry, from 1928 on, the DRC changed its approach, focussing instead on helping to prepare the population for the possible use of gas against civilians in a future war. For its change in tactics, the Red Cross came under attack from pacifists and other critics for legitimising chemical warfare rather than finding ways to abolish it completely. This critique became particularly damning when the National Gas Committee -a DRC creation -openly came out in support of arguments that gas was a militarily necessary and a humane means to wage war. The 
